Crisis 22

Exceptionalism

The Mad Cartographer (Aug. 2024) - Dec. 2022 - The Unmentioned History

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Dec. 2, 2022

It’s December 2, 2022, and Russia is being gently pressured to come to the negotiating table by Biden and Macron, who are meeting in Washington. Yet Russia won’t negotiate until their annexation claims are recognized, the U.S. won’t negotiate until Ukraine says it’s ready, and Ukraine won’t negotiate until Russia renounces its claims.

There are many causes for this disturbing gridlock, yet behind many of these causes lies a cause which is very difficult to discuss openly and honestly: the notion of exceptionalism. Both the U.S. and Russia believe they can use violence against nation states with a sort of transcendent impunity, as if the standards regarding sovereignty and violence don’t apply to them.

I abhor what Russia is doing to Ukraine, but I also abhor what the U.S. did to Vietnam. Yet where are the American admissions of military aggression? Where are the reparations? I can only hope that U.S. aggression is a thing of the past, but this is a very idealistic hope, as the Iraq War suggests. If the Americans won’t admit to what they did, why do we think the Russians will?

It’s not as if Russian military violence is (so far at least) any worse than what the Americans did in Vietnam. The brutal Russian bombings of this past November, which ripped apart the Ukrainian energy grid and left millions in the dark, is similar to the brutal bombings in Vietnam. Americans attacked infrastructure and dropped seven million tonnes of bombs on Vietnam and Laos. Seven million tonnes. In Operation Ranch Hand (1962-71) they dropped 19 million U.S. gallons of defoliants and herbicides. They dropped and fired about 350,000 tonnes of napalm. The U.S. hasn’t officially admitted to being in the wrong here, and it hasn’t made reparation for the physical destruction or for the medical damage to the population — the three million dead, and the deformed bodies one can see in the documented photos taken by the Vietnamese — or by the American combat photographer Ronald L. Haeberle. Here is one his less graphic photos of the My Lai massacre of 1968:

Some might argue that the American actions in Vietnam were completely different from the Russian actions in Ukraine, noting that the South Vietnamese government asked the Americans to intervene and that the Americans were fighting the tyranny of communism. This is true to an extent, especially when one accepts that the Viet Minh/Viet Cong version of communism ended up being the one-party Russian and Chinese variety rather than the multi-party variety found in West Bengal and Kerala (although not that of the Maoist Naxalites who are still ravaging India). Still, such an argument leaves out the Geneva Accord of 1954, where the Vietnamese were scheduled to vote in 1956 as a unified country.

The agreement was signed by the French and British, yet not by the Americans or the South Vietnamese government. This government was corrupt and didn’t have the support of the population. Clearly the Viet Cong infiltrated the South, yet equally clear is the local support the Viet Cong received in the South. In any case, four of the five million tonnes of bombs dropped by the Americans on Vietnam were dropped on South Vietnam. Add to this the Tonkin Bay scenario — where a non-existent incident triggered congressional approval to put boots on the ground at Danang — and it’s hard to justify the claim for American involvement, much less the apocalyptic level of bombing. Admittedly, however, the Vietnamese scenario is not as black and white as the Ukrainian scenario.

Both the U.S and Russia assert their aims are just. Americans say they were saving the world from communism in Vietnam and dictatorship in Iraq, and Russians say they're unifying the Russian people and saving the world from Ukrainian Nazis and the tyranny of the West. The Russian claims are debatable to some degree, in that the Ukrainians might have treated the Russian-Ukrainians with greater respect and the West has no doubt abused its power at times. Yet Russia’s claims are intended to have permanent consequences — the integration of Ukraine into Russia — whereas the U.S. never intended to integrate Vietnam or Iraq within its borders. Moreover, Russian aggression is in clear conflict with NATO, and this conflict is happening within Europe. This raises the spectre of World War III and nuclear war, a threat Russia has implied on numerous occasions.

Russian aggression here is unparalleled and clearly beyond the pale. But to the people and sovereign nations involved, the actions of the U.S. in Vietnam and the actions of Russia in Ukraine are equally brutal. If Russia’s actions are worse, then they should be held accountable to an even greater extent. But if we don’t have a firm and equal basis for accountability, it’s hard to proceed.

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This week Macron is making a great display of amity between France and the U.S. The meeting is a positive affirmation of liberal democratic values in the face of right-wing activity at home (Trump and Le Pen) and authoritarianism abroad (China, Iran, and North Korea). It’s also a dextrous way for France to counter what it sees as protectionism in the Inflation Reduction Act. With so much on his plate, it’s not surprising that Macron isn’t even subtly raising the thorny question of exceptionalism. Yet the French are capable of such diplomacy, as we saw with Villepin prior to the Iraq War: he implicitly confronted the assumption that allies should automatically go along with superpower aggression. By insisting that there was no basis for invading Iraq, Villepin challenged the notion of exceptionalism — the same exceptionalism Russia is now using when it assumes it can invade Ukraine. I agree with everything Biden and Macron say about democracy, but I wish they would say something beyond the obvious about the universality of sovereign rights.

In 🇺🇦 Golden Bridges (July 2022), I argued that many nations in the world see sanctions as a partisan strategy, one that wasn’t applied to Americans during or after their wars of choice in Vietnam and Iraq. I use the phrase war of choice intentionally, since it’s the term used against Russia at the moment. Again, I abhor Russia’s war of choice, and I find it even more globally reckless and dangerous than the American wars against Vietnam and Iraq. Yet by using this term I want to highlight that the U.S. and Russia both had a choice. They weren’t required by any international laws or expectations to begin their bombing campaigns. They chose to bomb because they felt it was the right thing to do. Moreover, they felt that they had a right to do what they wanted, no matter how violent. 

If the U.S. committed to avoiding the type of excessive force it used in Vietnam, and to avoiding the type of sovereignty infringement it made in Iraq, we could move toward a standard that could also be applied to Russia. It would be far more clear to the non-Western world that Russia is pursuing an aggressive interventionist agenda for which the West no longer makes allowance. More nations — not just in Africa and Asia, but also in Latin America — would come on board, pressuring Russia to get out of Ukraine. This would also strengthen international courts and the U.N., which might then actually be able to do something about nations which bully other nations.

Unfortunately, this isn’t likely to happen, for at least four reasons. First, the Americans are just as proud as the Russians, and as a result they’re very unlikely to officially admit they did anything wrong in Vietnam or Iraq. Second, the Americans don’t want to incur the monumental costs of reparation. Third, both the U.S. and Russia — and quite possibly other nations as well, such as China, India, Iran, Israel, etc. — want to retain the option of attacking another country. For instance, the U.S. and Israel may want to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities, the Chinese may want to invade Taiwan, and India or Pakistan may want to make a play for Kashmir. Fourth, most people in the West are still reeling from the brutality of the Russian invasion, and therefore tend to see the present brutality only in terms of present Russian aggression.

The reasoning seems to be, Don’t bring up Vietnam and Iraq; that’ll only confuse matters. It’ll only make people less eager to help Ukraine. But I would counter-argue that 1. we’ll support Ukraine in any case, and 2. we should simultaneously create the conditions under which Russia can effectively be held accountable. Russia may of course resist all accusations, yet if we have a firm and equal basis for accusations, then other nations may agree to blame Russia. This in turn may push Russia to accept blame. Even if Russia never accepts blame, a near-complete global condemnation might be used to trigger effective economic punishment and diplomatic isolation. 

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The Unmentioned History

On the podium Macron and Biden praise the centuries-old alliance between the U.S. and France. They recall the key moment when France helped to free the Americans from Britain, and when Americans returned the favour (twice) by freeing the French from the Germans. Yet lost in this laudable history is a moment both symbolic and real: the bombings of Vietnam, started by the French and continued with horrifying élan by the Americans. 

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In his 1955 novel The Quiet American, Graham Greene’s gets at the horror and the disgust that war brings, not just to the victims but also to the aggressors. In Vietnam, Frenchmen and Americans eventually recognized themselves in this horror, and tried to escape from everything by taking opium and heroin. In one scene, Greene’s protagonist, a journalist, goes up with the French pilot Trouin, who flies far above the victims below…

The cannon gave a single burst of tracer, and the sampan blew apart in a shower of sparks: we didn't even wait to see our victims struggling to survive, but climbed and made for home. I thought again as I had thought when I saw the dead child at Phat Diem, 'I hate war.’

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I said, “That sampan — this evening — was it doing any harm?”

Trouin said, “Who knows? In those reaches of the river we have orders to shoot up anything in sight.”

I smoked my first pipe. I tried not to think of all the pipes I had smoked at home. Trouin said, “Today's affair — that is not the worst for someone like myself. Over the village they could have shot us down. Our risk was as great as theirs. What I detest is napalm bombing. From 3,000 feet, in safety.” He made a hopeless gesture. “You see the forest catching fire. God knows what you would see from the ground. The poor devils are burnt alive, the flames go over them like water. They are wet through with fire.”

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Germans have said more mea culpas than any Catholic priest could dream of. The British have foregone Empire, from their forced exit from the Americas to their willing departures from the Indian subcontinent and Africa. The French have left West Africa and Indo-China, not without a nasty fight in Algeria, but eventually with the realization that they were right to leave. Russians, on the other hand, have yet to accept the logic of post-colonialism and the sovereign state. In order for Russians to accept this logic, it would be extremely helpful if Americans met them quarter-way in the negotiation of blame.

The Russians will continue to be fought on the battlefield and to be pressured in the corridors and high chambers of diplomacy. Yet in order for global diplomatic efforts to succeed, it would be helpful if the world saw that the doctrine of exceptionalism no longer operates, either for the U.S. or for Russia. It would be helpful if everyone agreed that while nations aren’t equal economically, they are equal in their right to sovereignty and self-determination.

The assumptions of exceptionalism once supported the great empires of the world. These assumptions may continue to operate in China and elsewhere if we don’t arrive at a universal agreement on the sovereignty of nations.

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